# stored-schnorr-key-enrollment-review

> Review stored supplied Schnorr keys with enrollment and enforced canonical use lacking modeled identity rejection.

Canonical: https://nightshade.dicksonwu.xyz/rules/stored-schnorr-key-enrollment-review.html
Release: Nightshade 0.1.1 (v0.1.1)

| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Rule ID | `stored-schnorr-key-enrollment-review` |
| Severity | info |
| Confidence | varies |
| Maturity | experimental |
| Selection | Opt-in |
| Policy intent | not required |
| Default enabled | no |
| Category | Other active opt-ins / Authorization, identity and membership |
| Engine facts used | complete-cell-writers, surviving-point-write, exact-enforced-signature-outcome, original-all-predicate-histories |
| Release | v0.1.1 |

## Selection and scope

Not selected by default. Select it with `--detectors` or the `detectors` list in nightshade.json. Either one replaces profile selection, so list every rule you want.

```sh
./.nightshade/node_modules/.bin/nightshade ./contracts --detectors stored-schnorr-key-enrollment-review
./.nightshade/node_modules/.bin/nightshade detector show stored-schnorr-key-enrollment-review
```

The first command runs only this rule; `--detectors` takes a comma-separated list. The second prints the rule's metadata from your installed version.

Severity is review priority. It does not express exploitability or impact. Confidence is detector metadata, not a probability. All built-in rules are experimental.

Compiler scope: the engine supports the pinned profiles 0.28.0, 0.29.0, 0.30.0, 0.31.1, 0.33.0-rc.2, 0.34.0, 0.35.0-rc.1 and 0.35.0, with ZKIR2 by default. Support for this rule can be narrower; the rule documentation below states any narrower scope.

## Corpus checks

Synthetic corpus checks for this rule in the 0.1.1 proof run. A check counts only with compiler acceptance and complete analysis.

| Positive detected | Corrected quiet | Lookalike quiet | Other negative quiet | Incomplete |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2/2 | 2/2 | 2/2 | 0/0 | 0 |

No deviations were recorded for this rule.

These are behavior checks on synthetic fixtures, not a precision or recall estimate. See [evaluation](https://nightshade.dicksonwu.xyz/evaluation.md#synthetic-corpus).

## Rule documentation

From https://github.com/DicksonWu654/nightshade/blob/v0.1.1/docs/detectors/stored-schnorr-key-enrollment-review.md at v0.1.1.

Availability: **opt-in**, informational severity, high confidence in the represented source relationship. No policy required. Select with `--detectors stored-schnorr-key-enrollment-review`.

Report a surviving raw entry-parameter Jubjub point write to a whole persistent Cell without modeled identity exclusion, paired with an enforced canonical `jubjubSchnorrVerify` use of an unknown entry-storage snapshot from the same declared Cell without modeled caller or internal identity exclusion. These are separate complete original histories. Common declaration identity does not prove equal values across transactions, a transaction sequence, identity feasibility, unsafe enrollment, sole authorization or application impact.

The exact canonical verifier outcome must be asserted true. Discarded outcomes, constant-returning wrappers, negated-result assertions, another verifier's outcome and a namesake application circuit do not satisfy that condition. Aliases and helpers preserve exact outcome occurrences. Boolean constants, negation and asserted conjunctions are represented; dynamic Boolean equality/inequality relays containing that occurrence produce scoped incomplete diagnostics, including relays inside conjunctions or represented vector/struct comparisons. False or negated whole conjunctions containing that occurrence remain conservatively incomplete. The pinned 0.35.0 and 0.35.0-rc.1 successful canonical verifier calls reject identity internally and are quiet for this conjunction.

All public writers, replacements, reachable helpers/imported instances and constructors are inventoried. The observer examines each successful history's final whole-Cell write; an unchecked temporary overwritten by a checked final point does not qualify. A later exact point check can reject the whole atomic invocation. Committed checkpoint histories are unsupported and produce scoped incomplete diagnostics. Complete writer inventory is not a claim that every stored point is valid. Implicit native defaults and construction are inventoried separately; a constructor's name or deployment use cannot establish trust.

Checks must apply to the exact surviving operand or verifier snapshot. Guards on message data, another parameter, a prior key or a later storage revision do not validate it. Mandatory identity comparisons and qualified native identity-to-identity transfers stay within each original history. An asserted nonidentity `ecMul`/`ecNeg` result excludes identity of that exact recorded input, without establishing curve or subgroup membership. Guarded enrollment with an unchecked verifier use is quiet for this conjunction; the existing `enrolled-signature-key-review` remains independent, including default-state or initialization concerns.

Relevant opaque predicates, lost identity/provenance, missing writer/use histories, malformed observations and exhausted shared allowances make the conjunction unavailable. Unrelated scalar/message checks do not donate validation. Identity compatibility with every constraint and a concrete successful identity input are not proved by missing represented identity exclusion.

Preparation, all exact dependent histories, retained evidence, immutable keys, native/predicate closure and emitted proof rows share the unchanged observation limits (40000 steps, 256 retained paths, 50000 abstract values by default). Point/key traversals also have bounded depth and work limits. Baseline analysis and unrelated detector findings remain independent. The experimental Counter-query mode does not carry this compilation-unit enrollment proof and reports unavailable evidence when selected.

A key enrollment can be intentionally managed by trusted setup or external
governance that is not represented in the analyzed source. Such a design can
match; the finding does not establish unsafe enrollment or a valid identity-key
attack.

## Suppress a match

If a match is intentional, suppress it on the line before with the exact rule ID and a reason of at least eight characters:

```compact
// nightshade-disable-next-line stored-schnorr-key-enrollment-review -- Reason this match is intentional
```

Diagnostics cannot be suppressed, and an unmatched directive for a selected rule makes analysis incomplete. See [configuration](https://nightshade.dicksonwu.xyz/configuration.md#suppress-an-intentional-match) for fingerprint suppressions and baselines.

## References

- [Rule source document at v0.1.1](https://github.com/DicksonWu654/nightshade/blob/v0.1.1/docs/detectors/stored-schnorr-key-enrollment-review.md)
- [Catalog entry in rules.json](https://nightshade.dicksonwu.xyz/rules.json)
- [All rules](https://nightshade.dicksonwu.xyz/rules.md#authorization-identity-and-membership)
- [Limitations](https://nightshade.dicksonwu.xyz/limitations.md)